What Authority does not do
Status: Experimental · V1 under construction. Authority has not been independently reviewed or audited. These limits follow the repository at commit 397ba8c; the first ones were written for the V0 engine (commit 6580fdf) and are kept where they still hold. The source remains authoritative.
Events are asserted, not authenticated
Events carry ASSERTED_UNVERIFIED. A decision evaluates claims in the supplied log; it does not prove the identity behind them. Authority Proof signs attestations about events, not the events themselves.
A decision is not permission to execute
A prospective AUTHORIZED result means compatible authority currently exists. It is not proof that a particular action instance may run. Instance-bound decisions and capability issuance exist for that purpose.
Concurrent plain decisions can overspend a budget
Two individually authorized decisions against the same budget can combine to exceed it. This is detected after the fact, not prevented. Capability issuance and single-use redemption run as transactions; that does not change this statement for plain decisions.
Redemption does not control the external effect
Single-use redemption is tested in memory and on PostgreSQL, including concurrent connections and separate processes. It does not run or deduplicate the effect itself: only the target system can do that.
The PostgreSQL journal is append-only for one role only
The application role can read and append but not update or delete. A superuser, the table owner, the database owner or anyone controlling the infrastructure can still alter or drop the journal.
No production-scale claim
Storage favors correctness over throughput and has not been benchmarked or operated at production scale. Authority is not ready for production.
Authority Proof is a feature of the engine, not proof of reality
An attestation is a signed statement that an event is in a journal. It is not an automatic proof that the events happened, or that an action was executed.
The journal's authenticity and completeness are not established
The checks can show that the statement was signed by a key you trust, that the journal you supply replays under the engine's rules, that its first events hash to the head named in the attestation, and that the signed statement matches what the engine derives from them. They cannot show that those events really happened, that none are missing, or that no different history exists. A journal fabricated consistently, with an attestation signed by a trusted key, passes. An anchor you hold from an independent source can contradict a history up to the anchored point, but it says nothing about later events, and the tool does not verify the anchor's independence.
The independence of an anchor is not verified
A trusted anchor is chosen by the verifier. The tool reports it as supplied by the verifier and does not check where it came from.
A key names a key, not a person; the signing time is a claim
A key identifier is derived from a public key. It does not identify a person or an organization, and the instant a statement was signed is the signer's own claim.
No timestamping, non-repudiation or certification
Authority Proof provides no timestamp, no non-repudiation and no certification. No conformance with JWS, COSE or WIMSE is claimed.
A valid signature is not a correct decision
Signature checks do not validate the decision. Replay re-derives it only against the journal you supply, and later revocations are reported for information, not as a verdict.
Replay is bounded
Replay cost grows faster than linearly: the default ceiling is 10,000 events, about 7 seconds end to end on a development machine.
No independent review yet
An independent cryptographic review of Authority Proof is prepared and has not started.